



CITY UNIVERSITY
LONDON

Interconnected safe and secure systems


Security and safety: tempo and trade-offs

Robin E Bloomfield, Adelard LP and City, University of London,
Peter Popov, City, University of London,

RiTICS Showcase


18th October 2018

Overview




CEDRICS Communicating and evaluating risk and dependencies

Stochastic models
of systems and
adversaries





Decision analysis and
communication based on
Claims, Arguments,
Evidence

How much should safety and security be integrated?



Slogan “If it’s not secure, it’s not safe”



Systems of systems

Figure 1: An illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom






Risk assessment

Training


Assurance and policy Framework

Standards and policy

Security-informed safety and resilience



Many projects: Sesamo, Aguas, IEC, BSI, IET ...




Security-Informed Safety

Kate Netkachova and Robin E. Bloomfield, Adelard LLP and City University London

For safety-critical systems, if it isn't secure, it isn't safe.

which a system malfunction could lead to accidents with marginal or negligible severity, to high criticality, in which a system failure or malfunction could result in death and



Security-Informed Safety: Supporting Stakeholders with Codes of Practice

Robin Bloomfield and Peter Bishop, Adelard LLP and City, University of London

Eoin Bur
Robert S

Codes
guidar
securi
engine
minde

engineers think, in order to make
"security-mindedness" a common



ROYAL
ACADEMY OF
ENGINEERING

Cyber safety and resilience

strengthening the digital systems
that support the modern economy

Kate Netkachova and Robin Bloomfield, City, University of London,
and Adelard LLP

» Computer Science » Software Engineering

Programming and Software Engineering



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Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification

First International Conference, RSSRail 2016, Paris, France, June 28-30, 2016, Proceedings

Editors: Lecomte, Thierry, Pinger, Ralf, Romanovsky, Alexander (Eds.)

Bloomfield, R. E., Bendele, M., Bishop, P. G., Stroud, R. & Tonks, S. (2016). The risk assessment of ERTMS-based railway systems from a cyber security perspective Methodology and lessons learned. Paper presented at the First International Conference, RSSRail 2016, 28-30 Jun 2016, Paris, France.

CYBERTRUST

PAS 11281

Connected automotive ecosystems – Impact of security on safety – Code of practice

September 2018

CPNI

Centre for the Protection
of National Infrastructure

RAIL CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SECURITY-INFORMED SAFETY

A GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE

OCTOBER 2018 (DRAFT)

Security-Informed
Supporting
Operators with
Code of Practice

shop, Adelard LLP and City, University

engineers think, in order to make
“security mindedness” a common
practice—to consider the impact
their work might have on security as
well as the impact security may have

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Cyber safety and resilience

strengthening the digital systems
that support the modern economy



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Assuring autonomy

Enclosure 2



Lloyd's Register
Foundation



UNIVERSITY
of York

Assuring Autonomy International Programme
Expression of Interest Form – Call 01

Towards Identifying and closing Gaps in Assurance of
autonomous Road vehicleS
(TIGARS)



ADELARD



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KANAGAWA UNIVERSITY






Short term

- Landscape and road mapping
 - Identify issues with practitioners
 - Transport, Nuclear,
 - Resilience community
 - Develop issues
 - Breadth and selective depth
 - Combine
 - Technology and threat awareness
 - Develop R&D roadmap
- Progress research
 - Tempo and agile assurance cases
 - Model based trade-off analysis

Overview






Safety and Security: trade-off analysis

- Trade-offs analysis between safety and security is often done qualitatively. The modelling approach to resilience improvement offers a quantitative alternative.
- Trade-offs between safety and security may be subject to review and change throughout the development process and after deployment
 - e.g. targets decided early may become infeasible or new threats may emerge
- We will scope tool support for quantitative trade-off analysis which covers the entire product life-cycle of safety-critical development: from feasibility to maintenance.

Model-driven approach to improving cyber- resilience of complex systems



- Explore role of *reference model* will assist decision makers to identify the space of credible alternatives.
- Compare using high-fidelity models, which will be derived for the specific “base-line” system and solved using PIA:FARA tools, designed to do that.



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